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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NORMA D. COX, ADMINISTRATRIX, 
OF THE ESTATE OF JACKSON 
BLAINE COX, DECEA'SED, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
CYRIL P. THOMPSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF THE DEF·ENDANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
7796 
This action was instituted to reeover the damages for 
the death of Jackson Blaine Cox, who was killed in an 
auto-pedestrian accident within the city limits of Orem, 
Utah, on U. S. Highway 91. This ap,peal is from the rul-
ing of the lower court by the Honorable William Stanley 
Dunford directing :a verdiet in favor of the .defendant be-
cause of the carelessness and negligence of the deceased 
in crossing the highway in the face of ap·proa.ching traffic 
at night and outside of a marked crosswalk. 
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FACTS 
As stated in Appellant's Brief, the accident occurred 
on U. S. Highway 91 from 50 to .100 feet north of thE 
corner of U. S. Highway 91 and Center Street. Ralph 
A. Peters, Chief of Police of Orem City, one of the in-
vestigating officers, measured the distance from wher8 
Mr. Cox's body was lying after the accident to the north 
line of the sidewalk on the north side of Center Street 
as 50 feet (R. 162-165, Tr. 147-150). Considering the 
fact that the sidewalk on the north side of Center Street 
is some distance north of the corner of Center Street and 
Highway 91 and the fact that the body obviously was not 
lying at the exact point where Mr. Cox was struck, the 
actual distance would be somewhere around 75 or 80 feet. 
To bett~r illustrate the general scene of the accident, 
we are inserting a photostatic copy of Exhibit A referred 
to and marked by the various witnesses. This map was 
drawn to scale and stipulated to be correct by both par-
ties with. the exception that the center lines dividing the 
street are incorrectly shown. It was agreed by the par-
ties that the center line~ were composed of two sets of 
double lines with a neutral zone of three or four feet b~­
tween the double lines (R. 2·5, 26- Tr. 9, 10). There was 
no marked crosswalk at the place of the collision, nor at 
the corner of U. S. Highway 91 and Center Street. Nor 
was there any traffic control device for north-south bound 
traffic at that corner. Center Street extends in an east-
erly direction from· U. ·s. Highway 91. Center Street 
stops at Highway 91 and does not continue on on the west 
side. There is a private gravel driveway opposite Center 
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Street on the west side of Highway 91. There are two 
lanes, each 12 feet "Tide, for traffic on each side- of the 
higlnYay plus a "parking lane" approximately 24 feet 
'vid~ on each side. The total width of the street is 96 feet 
(Exhibit .A.). 
The chain of events leading up to this accident is 
as follows: 
~Ir. and ~Irs. Cox and three other couples, Alma 
and Ruth Ferre, Roy and Thelma Clark and Mayland 
and Betty Russell had planned to attend an Eagles' 
Dance at Provo, Utl;l,h (R. 22 - Tr. 6). Prior to going to 
the dance they gathered at the Clark home at Orem, Utah, 
at about 9 :00 or 9 :30 P.M. on Jal?-uary 20, ~951 .. Accord-
ing to Mrs. Clark, who served the liquor, e.ach me-mber 
of the party had at least two drinks prior to leaving 
. (R. 128 - Tr. 112). The couples left the Clark home at 
about 10 :00 P.M. and went to the dance at the Federation 
Room in Provo (R. 128 - Tr. 112). Mr. Cox, dece-ased, 
took two pints of whiskey to the dance with him (R. 45., 
46, 47 - Tr. 29, 30, 31) which were consumed during the 
course of· the evening, each party having at least two 
n1ore drinks (R. 47, 64- Tr. 31, 48). After the dance, the 
group returned to the Clark residence where they re-
Inained about half an hour when they decided to go to the 
Crown Cafe, which is located in the immediate vicinity 
of the accident on the west side of Highway 91 in Orem, 
Utah, (R. 65- Tr. 49) (Exhibit A). 
Mr. and Mrs. Cox left the Clark home in the F:erre 
automobile with ~{r. and Mrs. Ferre. The other couples 
were to follow (R .. 22- Tr. 6). The Coxes and the Ferres 
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arrived at the Crown Cafe at about 1 :00 A.M. (R. 23- Tr. 
7). They went down into the basement where the lounge 
of the cafe is located. Eight setups for mixed drinks 
were ordered (R. 23- Tr. 7). When the two other couples 
did not arrive, Mr. Cox grew impatient and decided to 
go home. The Fe.rres and Coxes had left the lounge and 
were outside the cafe when the other two couples drove 
up in the Clark automobile (R. 23, Tr. 7). 
Apparently all of the group, except Mr. Cox decided 
to return to the cafe. Just as Mrs. Cox was entering 
the cafe, M,rs. F·erre remarked to her, "Are you leaving? 
Are you going~ Jack is leaving." (R. 40- Tr. 24). Mrs. 
Cox turned and observed that Mr. Cox was proceeding 
across Highway 91 toward the east and was six or seven 
feet beyond or to the east of the double line in the center 
of the street (R. 28- Tr. 12). His position on the highway 
at that time is shown by the black circle east of the center 
lines on Exhibit A. Mr. Cox was ap~parently on the way 
to his horne, which is located five or six blocks away (R. 
40 ... Tr. 24). At the time he was dressed in dark clothing, 
a navy blue suit and a bluish gray top coat (R. 40; 41 -
Tr. 24, 25). Mrs. Cox called to him and ordered, "Come 
on back. If you are going home, we will go in the car." 
(R. 41- Tr. 25). Mrs. Cox saw Mr. Cox turn and start 
back across the street. She had turned to open the car 
door when she heard the screech of brakes. She did not 
see the actual impa~t nor the car which struck her hus-
band prior to the time he was struck (R. 241- Tr. 25). 
Mr. Fe-rre vvas the only me·mber of the ·group with 
Mrs. Cox, who claimed to see, the accident. He had enter-
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ed the rafe for a second time after the Clarks and Rus-
sells arrived but had again stepped outside whe:n he 
noticed his wife and the Coxes were not with hiln (R. 68 -
Tr. 52). He was standing at the point m·arked "XF" on 
Exhibit .A .. an~ claims to have observed Cox over the top 
of an auton1obile, \Vhich was five feet high (R. 80, 81 - Tr. 
64, 65). \\'hen the witness first saw Mr. Cox, Mr. Co~ 
''" .. as on his \vay from the other side of the road in about 
the sa1ne position as when Mrs. Cox saw him, six or seven 
feet east of the center lines down the middle of the· road 
(R. 69- Tr. 53). The witness' attention was diverted for 
a second or two (R. 69- Tr. 53). The ~ext thing he saw 
was Mr. Cox flying through the air. He· places the pnint 
of impact near the dividing line between the two south-
bound lanes of traffic at the point rnarked "XF" on Ex-
hibit A. He did not se·e the automobile which struck Mr. 
Cox prior to the impact (R. 74- Tr. 58). 
Defendant, Cyril Thompson, and his two comp·anions, 
Leon Wimber and Karl S.mith, were traveling to their 
home in Springville, Utah from a basketball game. and 
movie in Salt Lake· City (R. 243, 244- Tr. 228, 229). All 
three were sitting in the front seat of the automobile, 
the defendant on the left, Leon Wimber on the right and 
Karl Smith in the middle (R. 244- Tr. 229). Leon Wim-
ber testified that they were tra veiling about 35 miles per 
hour and then continued (R. 246 - Tr. 231) : 
"Q. And what did you see~ 
A. I was watching the road ahead, and the 
lane of traffic in which we were traveling. The 
lights were on dim, because of the oncoming traf-
fic. I saw a dark shadow step from the left hand 
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side of the automobile, which was, in the east of 
us., directly into our lights, from the side. He 
stepped from the side into our lights.. I saw a 
person move, from the· east to the we~t, into our' 
lane of traffic. 
Q. How would you describe .what you saw1 
A. I sa'Y a dark shadow, a dark object. 
Q. Dark ohjeet, and. what form did it have, if 
any~ 
.A. My impression was that it was a man. 
Q. Was it moving 'in either direction~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which direction was he headed~ 
A. From east to wes.t. 
Q. Did you observe what direction he was 
looking~ 
A. West. 
Q.. And did you say he was moVIng from 
eas.t to west~ 
A. Yes, ·he was moying in a westerly direc-
tion~ 
Q. Did he get - was he in your lane of 
traffic~ 
A. He move~d into our lane of traffic. 
Q. And how far did he get into your lane of 
traffic, the l'ast you saw him there~ · 
A. Half way across, approximate~y. 
Q. Do you have any judgment as to how far 
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... \.. I thought at the time it was probably 15 
feet ahead of the car." 
Continuing on page 248 (Tr. 233): 
hQ. Now what if anything did the car do 
that you 'vere in, or that you observed that Cyril · 
Thompson do, 'vith respect to the car~ 
A. The car swerved sharply to the east. 
Q. Did you see or hear an impact of any 
kind! 
A. I saw an impact. 
Q. And will you describe that to the, best of 
. your ability f State where it was and-. 
A. When I first saw the man, he was to the · 
left of the front of the car, and as we swerved, it 
brought the right fender nver to where he was at, 
and he hit right aqout where the light and the 
hood came in contact there, and rolled up o;ver the 
right fender, partly on .the hood, off of the fender 
and down to the side, immediately in front of my-
self. 
Q. And was the point of impact within your 
lane of traffic~ · 
A. It was. 
Q. I believe you said that he· had got to 
about the middle of your lane, or somewhere in 
there~ 
A. That's right. 
Q.· When this occurred, were you observing 
the two lines on either side ·o:f your lane of traffic~ 
A. Ahead of us, I was. 
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Karl 'Smith testified that he looked up just as the car 
in which he was riding started to swerve and that there 
was a pedestrian about 15 feet in front of them. "He ap-
peared to be in the middle .of the southbound lane, and at 
the time of theimpact, it just seemed to pick him up and 
just drop him off to the side- of the center." (R. 270- Tr. 
255). He te~stified that the automobile was traveling 
south in the lane marked "2" on Exhibit A and that the 
are:a around the cafe at the place o~ the accident was 
"pretty dark.'' (R. 27 4- Tr. ·259). 
Cyril Thompson, the defendant, testified he was 
driving his stepfather's Hudson automobile on the trip 
from Salt Lake to Springville. He and his companions 
left Salt Lake at approximately 12:30 A.M. (R. 281- Tr. 
266). He observed the single line ·on his left separating 
traffic lanes and estimates that this left line was two to 
three feet from the automobile ( R. 285, 288, 304 - Tr. 270, 
273, 289). His testimony concerning what he saw and did 
is as follows (R. 286 - Tr. 271) : 
"Q. Well, what was the first thing you did 
see that caused you any - caused you concern, if 
anything~ 
A. Well, I was just driving down the road, 
weren't saying anything, just driving, and I seen 
this- well, I seen Mr. Cox now. I seen him when 
he ste~pped into the lights. And that is the first 
time I seen him. 
Q. ·what lights do you have reference to? 
A. The headlights on the car. He stepped 
into the lane, where the lights go the strongest, 
down the center of the lane. 
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Q. \Vl1ieh direction was he going' 
A. He was heading across the street west. 
Q. Did you see him at any time facH the car~ 
A. No, I couldn't see him. All I could see 
after I did see him was a silhouette. There was 
no form there at all, just a dark silhouette. 
Q. When you first saw this silhouettH in 
front of you, I ·will ask you how far ahead of you 
it was, appeared to be, ·~s far as. your vision was 
concerned~ 
A. Well, I could see the full length of him, 
and possibly-. probably two or three feet of high-
way. I couldn't specify as to how much highway, 
but I could see the full height of the man. 
Q. Was he on the move, or was he standing 
still, or do you know~ 
A. Well, his legs were apart, I could see -
and I never seen him until he came into view into 
the lights from the side. 
Q. Now prior to the time you saw him, whe:e 
were you looking~ 
A~ I was looking straight ahead, down the 
road. 
Q. Could you see your lane of traffic~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could you see the entire lane of traffic~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there anything there prior to the 
time he e·ntered your lane~ 
A. Nothing. I couldn't see anything in the 
lane at ·all. 
Q. Was he on the move when you saw.him~ 
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A. Yes, he had entered in from the side of 
the lights, and that is the first time I seen him 
was when he ste:p·ped into the light there. 
Q. Could you tell which direction he was 
headed~ 
A. He was headed west. 
Q. And what did you do if anything when 
you s:aw him~ · 
A. Well, I could se:e· him stepping to the 
west, so I immediately swerved the car to the east, 
which would have been my left. 
Q. Were your hands on the wheel during this 
tim ~ e. 
· A. Yes. 
Q. Had they been on the wheel prior to the 
time you swerved~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you do anything else, other than 
swerve your car~ 
A. Well, at the same time I swerved, I pro b-
. a;bly dep,ressed the clutch at the· same time. It all 
happened at the same time. I swerved, depressed 
the clutch, ·and applied the brakes a small amount. 
I don't think I applied them all, completely, be-
cause of the force of stopping and turning too, it 
didn't seem reasonable. 
Q. You did apply your brakes, you put your 
foot on the brakes~ 
A. Yes. 
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The physical facts of the accident are illustrated l:.y 
Exhibit .. A. and the testin1ony of Ralph H; Peters, OrePl 
City Chief of Police, "\vho testified that he was inside the 
Orem Fire Station of the Orem -City Hall (Exhibit A, 
R._ 159 163 - Tr. 1-±±, 1 ±S). He was facing west and look-
ing toward U.S. Highway 91. His attention was directed 
to the defendant's automobile as it swerved, ('R. 172- Tr. 
157). He stated that he· could see both headlights as the 
car swerved but was unable, at that time, to tell what had 
occurred (R. 160 - Tr. 145). He, together with Officer 
Cook got into the police car and drove out on the highway. 
As he left the entrance of the fire station and turned to-. 
ward the highway, he saw 1\{r. Cox lying on the highway 
with Mrs. Cox bending over him (R. 172- Tr. 157). 
He stated that Mr. Cox was. lying ap·proximately on 
the line separating the first two southbound lanes of traf-
fic (R. 161 - Tr. 146) 50 ·feet north of a perpendicular 
line drawn across U. s .. Highway 91 fron1 the north side 
of the sidewalk on the north of Center Street; (R. 162, 199 
Tr. 147, 184) at the point where the red circle appear~ on 
Exhibit A. (R.166- Tr. 151). 
Small pieces of chrome from the headlights of 
defendant's car were found three to five feet north of 
Mr. Cox's body, shown by the two blue "X's" in the second 
lane west of the center .highway on Exhibit A. Defend-
ant's car stopp·ed on the east side of the· highway in front 
of the City Hall vvhe,re the red rectangle appears on Ex-
hibit A (R. 169·- Tr. 154). The distance from the pieces 
of chrome to the front of defendant's. car at the point 
where it stopped is 67 feet (R. 17?- Tr. 161). The center 
11 
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of·damage to the car driven by the defendant was on the 
right front between the headlight and radiator (R. 188 
Tr. 173). 
Officer Peters noted that Mr. Cox's breath smelled of 
intoxicating liquor and that he was wearing dark clothing 
(R. 171- Tr. 156). The witness testified that the-re was a 
dark spot encompassing that general area of the. highway 
where the accident occurred (R. 171 - Tr. 156). The tire 
marks of defendant's automobile commenced in lane two 
on Exhibit A and extended across the highway to the 
east (Exhibit A, R. 174 - Tr. 159). In the officer's opin-
ion, hased upon the physical evidence, the defendant'R 
automobile could not have been traveling over 35 miles 
per hour (R. 178- T·r. 163). 
Police Officer Cook, who assisted Officer Peters 
testified that he had observed the general area of the 
highway where the accident occurred on several occa-
sions. and that when the large neon sign of the Crown 
Cafe is out, there is a dark area in the highway where this 
accident occurred (R. 213, 216 - Tr. 198, 201). 
Howard R. Jacobsen, Fire Chief at Orem, testified 
that Mr. Cox, after the accident, was lying across the line 
dividing the two s.outhbound lanes of traffic with his feet 
in the second lane ( R .. 222 - Tr. 207). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court directed 
a verdict for the defendant. The court's aetion was not · 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Po·i:nt No. 1. The presumption that deceas.ed exe·r-
eised due care disappeared when the positive evidence 
showed the deceased was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
Point No. 2. Under the evidence, the decedent was 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
Point No. 3. The causal connection between the 
negligence of the deceased and the accident was so patent 
as to preclude the submission of that issue to a jury. 
Point No. 4. The evidence clearly shows that the 
doctrine of last clear chance could not be invoked and 
could not, therefore, be submitted to the jury. 
POINT NO. 1 
The presumption that deceased exercised due care 
disappeared when the positive eviden~e showed the de-
ceased was guilty of contributory negligence .. 
In Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 495, · 
the evidence was that the deceased and his wife were 
crossing 13th East Street in the vicinity of Westminste:r 
Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah. His wife testified that 
as "they step~ped off the curb and started easterly across 
Thirteenth East Street, decedent was to her left or north; 
that he looked neither to his left nor right, but looke·d 
straight ahead as they proceeded across the street; th·a:t 
he said nothing to her -~bout ap-proaching traffic; that 
she did not hear or see defendant's automobile until it 
struck; and that they had proceeded about a quarter of 
the '\vay (about 10 feet) across the street when they were 
13 
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struck." A verdict was directed against the deceased's 
heirs and . the verdict was attacked, as here, . on the 
ground, among others, that the de~e·dent was entitled to a 
presumption that the deceased exerc1sed due care for his 
own safety. The court he~d: 
"Plaintiff relies on an asserted presumption 
that deceased was, at the time of his injury, in the 
exercise of due care for his own safety. It is true 
that in certain death cases, there is a presump-
tion that decedent was in the exercise of due care 
for his own. safety. But there is no room for such 
a presumption where, as here, there was positive 
evidence not only as to the. fatal aooident its.elf, 
but to the conduct of decedent leading up to the 
fatal accident. Such a presumption 1nust give way 
to the positive evidence adduced." 
None of the cases cited in Appellant's Brief contra-
dict this proposition of law. In Compton, et al v. Ogden 
Union Ry & Depot Co., (Utah) 235 Pac. (2d) 515, a Mrs. 
Laws was with the deceased at the time she was- killed and 
te~stified of her actions up to the time of her death. The 
deceased was killed by a train while crossing a railroad 
track and the evidence showed that prior to crossing, 
she had an unimpaired view of the railroad tracks for 
300 feet. The court dismissed plaintiff's case and the pre-
sumption of due care was argued on appeal. The court 
held as set out in pJaintiff's. brief: 
"The presumption is applicable where there 
is no e~vidence· as to care used, or perhaps where 
the evidence comes from an adverse witness who 
may be subject t~, disbelief by the jury, or where 
there is sufficient uncertainty in the, evidence as 
to cast doubt on the testimony." 
14 
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The court then continued, which is not set out in Appel-
lant's Brief: 
~~It has no application where, as here, the de--
ceased is obserYed during the period p,rior to and 
at the time she is fatally injured and the witness 
is available and testified." 
In Tuttle v. PacifiC Intermountain. Express, (Utah 
1952), 2-±2 Pac. (2d) 764, the Judge did instruct the jury 
that, in the absence qf evidence to the contrary, the de-
ceased 'vas presumed to use due care for his own p·rotec-
tion. Two of the three concurring justices were of the 
opinion that the presumption had been destroyed by evi-
dence of the deceased's conduct, and that giving the in-
struction could only confuse the jury, but decided the 
error was not prejudicial. Justice Crockett, · the third 
concurring justice, thought the p-resumption ap·plicahle 
but only because there was no evidence of deceased's con-
duct. Quoting Justice Crockett: 
"The jury's verdict for the plaintiff plainly 
shows that they did not believe the deceased was 
going southward, but on the contrary their finding 
was that he was coming north. Under these cir-
cumstances, there is no evidence whatsoever re-
garding his conduct just preceding his death." 
It is elementary that presumptions are of evidentiary 
value only and must give way to p·ositive evidence to 
the contrary, as this co-urt held in the ·Mingus case, supra. 
They control only where there is no evidence to the con-
trary. 
In the case at bar, the uncontradicted testimony of 
all the witnesses, which will be covered in greater detail 
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In the next section, was that the deceased had crossed 
over on the east side of Highway 91 at a point where 
there was no cross walk, marked or otherwise, and that 
he then turned, started back across the road and walked 
directly into the path of defendant's automobile. Only 
one conclusion can be drawn from this testimony, and 
that is that decedent was completely oblivious of defend-
ant's approaching car, having either failed to look for 
defendant's car or to see what was to be se·en. 
This is corroborated by the undisputed physical 
facts testified to by the investigating officer, which estab-
lished that the deceased had completed crossing the 
southbound lane of traffic nearest the center and was 
cro-~sing the s.econd or defendant's lane of travel when 
struck. Damage to the right front of the car, the skid 
marks and the testimony of the eye witnesses show that 
Mr. Cox was s:truck as the car swerved southeasterly to 
miss him, his body being carried up o:ver the hood and 
coming to rest on· the marked line~ between the two south-
bound lanes of travel next west of the center zone. 
Chrome from the grille was found after the impact just 
north and a little west of the body in the second south-
bound lane from the center. The· skid marks for 67 feet 
showed defendant was not exceeding the 40 mile speed 
limit and probably not exceeding a maximum of 30-35 
miles per· hour. 
In Heath v. Klosterman, 23. A. (2d) 209 (Penn.), the 
decedent was struck and killed by a truck as he alighted 
from his parked car. _Judgment for the plaintiff was re-
versed on appeal, the court holding decedent guilty of 
16 
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negligence as a 1natter of law. Discussing the presump-
tion of due e;are, the court said: 
"Even though Doctor Heath is dead and ordi-
narily a presumption might arise that he exer-
cised due care, this p·resumption is destroyed in 
the instant case by the testimony adduced by 
plaintiff. As held in Watkins v. Prudential Ins. 
Co., 315 P·a. 497, a presumption such as, this is not 
evidence, and it cannot be weighed as evidence, 
since, it gives way the moment p~roof to the con-
trary· is presented. This conclusively appeared 
in the presentation of plaintiff's own case, for the 
evidence established . that Doctor Heath did not 
look. l\Ioreo-ver, the accident having happened in 
broad daylight, he must have seen the trucks had 
he looked before stepping out. There can be no 
presumption as against facts whieh are p:roven." 
In Heintz v. Southern Pacific Company, (Cal.) 147 
Pac. (2d) 621, the decedent drove his automobile into a 
freight car which was parked on a siding. The lower 
court granted a motion for a non-suit which was a:ffirmed 
on appeal. In discussing the presumption of care which 
was raised by the ap·p-ellant, the court said : 
"The ap~pellants, however, rely on the pre-
sumption that the deceased exercise·d due care for 
his own safety and argue that thi's P'resumption 
is sufficient to raise a question of fact for the jury. 
They go so far as to argue that this p·resumption 
'declares that whatever the decedent may or may 
not have done he was not negligent.' This argu-
ment. overlooks the well established rule that this 
presumption of due care is dispelled and disap-
pears from the case when a fact which is wholly 
irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontra-. 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dieted testimony produced by the party relying on 
the presumption. 
"* * * Where the app~ellant's own evidence 
clearly establishes .that the deceased was familiar 
with this crossing, that the fruit car wa:s- visible 
and should have been seen· by any driver who was 
exe·rcising any care at all, and where there was 
ample room to pass on either side of the fruit car, 
even if rHasonable care was belatedly used .. Under 
the circumstances here ap·pearing, we think any 
presumption of due care was dispelled :t>Y the facts 
clearly prorved by the appellants, that under those 
facts the deceased was guilty of -contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law, and that the trial court 
correctly so held." 
This defendant earnestly contends that the presump-
tion of due care in the in·stant case was dispelled by the 
evidence of all the witnesses that decedent did· nothing 
other than walk directly into the path of defendant's 
automobile, completely· unaware that there was any auto,.. 
mobile. It cannot be said that he· exercised due care when 
the positive facts show so clearly that he did not .. 
POINT NO.2 
__ Under the, ·evidence· the· decedent was guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law. 
_··Title 57-7-143 (a) Utah Code A'YI!notated 1943, as 
amended, provides: . 
"(a) Eve~ry person crossi~g a roadway at 
any point other than within a marked crosswalk 
or within an unmarked cros!swalk at an intersec-
tion shall yield the right of way to all vehicles up-
. h d " on t e roa way. 
It is clear that as soon as decedent left the cente·r 
18 
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of the high,Yay and proceeded directly into the path of 
southbound traffic, he failed in his duty to yield the- right 
of ,yay as provided by law... His failure to a:ct in this 
regard was negligence of a most apparent kind, and it is 
readily seen that had he not continued his course the 
accident would :not have occurred. 
In Fearn v. City of Philadelphia, (Pa.) 182 AtL 534, 
the court said : 
~,,,7 .. hen a pedestrian trave-rses a street be-
tween intersections, since he is not crossing ·at a 
place where he is expected to be, he must exercise 
a higher degree of care for his safety; motorists 
are correspondingly held to a less degree of care.~' 
See also Sheldon v. James, (Cal.) 166 Pac. 8, where 
the court said : 
"A greater degree of care is necessary upon 
the part of the pedestrian who unde·rtakes to cross 
a congested highway other than at the established 
crosswalk and especially so if in the act he does 
not essay a direct crossing, hut. pursues a long . 
diagonal route. 
"The observation of ordinary care by such 
a pedestrian is not. fully performed ~y merely 
looking to the left or right as he steps upon the 
street. The observance of that care 'is imperative 
.upon him during all of the time that he is cross-
ing." 
The Supreme Court. of Michigan in Malone v. Vining, 
313 Mich. 315, 21 N:· E. (2d) 144, aptly defined the duty 
of pedestrians as. follows: 
. "Under present-day traffic conditions a pe-
destrian, before crossing a street or highway, 
rnust (1) make proper observation as to a.pproach-
19 
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ing traffic, ( 2) observe ap.proaching traffic and 
form a judgment as to its distance away and itB 
speed, (3) continue his observations while cross-
ing the street or highway, and (4) e~xercise that 
degre·e, of care and caution which an ordirrarily 
prudent person would exercise under like circum-
stances.'' 
The evidence conclusively shows that the decedent 
did not exercise the degree of care of a reasonably pru-
dent person. It naturally and logically follows that such 
heedless and inattentive conduct was negligence as a 
matter of law. Numerous courts, including the Utah Su-
preme Court, in similar situations, have so held. 
In Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 495, 
a directed verdict was sustained on the grounds of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence. In ·concluding that the 
plaintiff either did not look or did not make sufficient 
or ad~quate observation, this court said: 
"More convincing than the direct testimony 
that deceased did not look, is the further evidence 
that deceased neither said nor did anything to in- . 
dicate that he was at all aware of the danger pre-
sented by defendant's approaching automobile·. 
He seems to have been wholly unaware of its ap-
proach. Certainly he did nothing either to warn 
his wife, nor to rescue either himself or her from 
their position of peril. On this evidence, it must 
be said as a matter of law that deceased either 
failed to look, or having looked, failed to see· vvhat 
he should have seen." 
In Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 719, 
plaintiff and his. wife _were crossing the main street of 
Logan, Utah, from east to west at a point between inter-
20 
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sections. They stopped so1newhere over the center of 
the high,v-ay on the \Yest side of the street to allow south-
bound traffic to pass. Plaintiff \vas gazing in a south-
westerly direction \Vhen defendant's automobile, . ap-
proaching from the north struck the plaintiff and injured 
hiln. Plaintiff~s \Yife had seen the impending danger 
and had stepped out of the way. Verdict was directed in 
fayor of defendant by the lower co.urt and affirmed on 
appeal, the court saying: 
"Appellant was aware of the fact that he was 
taking a chance in crossing the street at a place 
contrary to law. ~He should also have known that 
a driver of a vehicle would not ordinarily antici-
pate the presence of pedestrians on the street at 
the time and place of the accident. Knowing th·at 
his presence might not be anticip·ated and knowing 
that traffic on the west side of the road was ap-
proaching from the north and with nothing of 
importance to distract his attention, it was ap·pel-
lant's duty to watch the traffic he knew was ap-
proaching his location.· 
"* * * ·Having omitted to continue to watch, 
he failed to exercise the degree of care required 
of ·a pedestrian who leaves a place of safety and 
places himself in a position of peril. A greater 
degree of care is necessary up·on the part of a 
pedest.rian who undertakes to cross a city street at 
a prohibited place than is placed on one who 
uses a marked crosswalk." 
Tysinger v. Cobble Dairy Products, (N.C.) 36 S. E. (2d) 
267: 
"Now, then, as to the alleged contributory 
negligence of plaintiff's testate, it is sufficient to 
say that in crossing the highway at a point other 
21 
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than a marked crosswalk at an intersection it was 
his duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles 
upon the highway. G.S. Sec. 20-174 (a). The high-
way was visible according to all the evidence, for 
at least 300 yards in. the direction from which the 
truck of the. defendant was approaching. And in 
leaving the point where he was talking to the wit-
ness. Everhardt to go toward his home, he neces-
sarily faced in the direction of the oncoming truck. 
He must have seen the truck and taken the chance 
of crossing or, have 'been inattentive to the duty 
imposed upon him by law, and started across with-
out looking for vehicles on the highway. In either · 
event, a reading the evidence leads to the conclu-
sion as a matter of law, that his own conduct con-
tributed to his injury and death, unfortunate and 
regrettable as it may be." 
In Horton, et al v. Stoll, (Cal.) 40 P·ac. (2d) 603, 
plaintiff, a twenty-year old girl, was crossing between 
intersections. not in a pedestrian lane. As she came to 
the further west car track, first rail, she hesitated and 
looked or glanced to the north, but failed to remember 
what, if anything, she saw. She was under t~e impres-
sion, howe,yer, that she.had plenty of time to cross the 
street. After taking a s.te.p or so, and while she, was still 
on the car track, she was hit by the left front fender 
of defendant's car coming from the north. In sustaining 
a non-suit, the: court said: 
. "We are of the· opinion that the facts of this 
case show affirmatively that plaintiff failed to use 
due ·care and that she failed in this· respect was 
the proximate cause of the injury. 
"Had she looked she must have see·n defend-
ant's car approaching a few feet away, for she· had 
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taken only a step or two from her position of 
safety when she was struck. · 
''It was plaintiff's duty from the position she 
was in upon the highway to yield to.· defendant the 
right of way. 
"The only conclusion that can be reached fron1 
the evidence is that plaintiff failed to take the 
trouble to properly look for automobiles on the 
side of the street as she crossed, or that she saw 
. the automobile and for some unexplained reason 
stepped directly in its path. Under either theory 
she failed to use due care, which precludes her 
rights of recovery." 
In Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d) 680, this 
court in holding plaintiff guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law said: 
"A case very similar to the instant case is 
Andrus v. S. J. Boudreaux & Son, La. Ap~p·. 158 
·so. 679. There the plaintiff was foreman of about 
twelve men engaged in· roadwork, about half of 
them being on each side of the road, but not on the 
paved portion, ·as defendant's truck ap·proached. 
The paymaster -had just pulled up his car across 
the road from the plaintiff who procee-ded to cross 
the road diagonally to the p·ayrnaster's car. The 
plaintiff testified he did not see defendant's truck, . 
but the court noted a probable inference that he 
·saw it fro·m the fact that he had 'walked unusually 
fast, rushed or run.' But this was immaterial as 
the court found: 'The on-coming truck was in full 
open view of the road and.was bound to have be~en 
seen by the plaintiff had he looked down the road 
at the time of starting across.' The court then held 
the plaintiff to the knowledge he would have had if 
he· had looked and held: 'It was his duty to look 
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for his safety before starting across.- He must be 
regarded as having seen the truck whHther he 
looked or not'; and the court approved the hold-
ing of the lower court that plaintiff was guilty of · 
contributory ne-gligence a.s a matter of law. 'He 
should not ·have thus voluntarily, heedlessly, and 
thoughtlessly left a S'afe place and exposed him:-
self to an obvious danger by trying to cross the 
road under the circumstances which attended such 
a movement.' 
"As the court said in Andrus v. S. J. Boud-
reaux & Son, supra, he was chargeable with what 
he would have se·en had he looked. He either pro-
ce-eded without looking or, having seen the ap-
proaching car, he chanced crossing in face of the 
hazard. The latte-r would clearly, under the cir-
cumst'ance~s, have been negligence on his part. The 
approaching vehicle· was at the instant of de-
ceased's entry onto the pavement so ne·ar that no 
p-rudent person would attempt crossing in front 
· of it. The more ·reasonable inference is he did not· 
see the. car. But had he looked he would have seen 
it, and he is charge~d with knowledge of what he 
would have seen had he the duty to look. We 
think that he. clearly had such duty. 
• • * 
"The' presence of the barriers. on the un-
traveled portion of the highway and of piles of 
dirt on the side· of the P'Rve·ment, and the presence 
of workmen, would not justify deceased in assum-
ing that the driver of a vehicle will, because of the 
presence of these elements, so ~rive as to avoid 
striking one who, without looking, darts out into 
the path of the vehicle. We conclude: that unde~· 
the evidence viewed most :favorably to the plain-
tiffs the deeeased was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law.'' 
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Appellant in analyzing the deceased's conduct asks 
the court to indulge in conje-cture and ·speculation and to 
assmne a set of facts not supported .by, but contrary to 
the evidence, that is, that defendant stop-ped before cross-
ing in front of defendant and that. the defendant de-
liberately turned and ran deceased down. 
Appellant cites the testimony of Mr. Ferre as evi-
dence that the impact occurred in the first and not the 
second lane for traffic southbound on the highway. Such 
a conclusion is not warranted by his testimony. Mr. 
Ferre \Yas observing the scene from the side of the road 
over the top of a five foot automobile (R. 81 - Tr. 65). 
He did not see defendant's car ·p·rior to the impact~ Nor 
did he keep his eyes constantly on deceased (R. 69 - Tr. 
53). He saw the flash of the impact (R. 75 ~ Tr. 59), 
heard the glass· or the headlight break and saw Mr. Cox 
go through the air and land on the ceme·nt (R. 71 - Tr. · 
55). He places the point of impact in the vicinity ·of the 
line dividing the two lanes for southbound traffic (R. 
70 - Tr. 54). Considering the limited observation of the 
witness and that he was observing from a point off to 
the side of the road over t~e top. of anotheT automobile, 
such a point can only be an approximation. That point 
is approximately in the· same place as te:stified to by othe~r 
witnesses and as .illustrated by the physical evidence. 
Nor should we, in our consideration·s, · lose sight of 
the real negligence of the deceased, which is that deced-
ant walked directly into the path of defendant's automo--
bile completely unaware of the -approach of that auto-
mobile which was there to be seen. There is nothing in 
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Mr. Ferre'.s te,stimony contrary to this. In fact, that is 
his testimony. .On p~ge 69 of the record, he testified as 
follows. (Tr. 53) : 
"Q. Now did you watch Mr. Cox· at that 
time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. · And what did you see·~ 
A. He was on his way hack, and I seen the 
·point of impiaet. 
Q. Did .you watch him all the way hack~ 
A. Well; there might have been a second or 
two there I never p·aid much attention to.it. 
Q. Now could you see. Mr. Cox from where 
you were·, when he was out in the road there~ 
A. . Yes, very good." 
On p;age 75 of the record (Tr. 59), Mr. Fie.rre. testi-
fied: 
"Q. Then I assume you didn't watch during 
the interval·you saw Mr. Cox over here, until the 
time of imp:act, that y~u just saw the impact~ 
A. Oh, I seen Jack 1a.s·he was on hi:s way back 
to the point of impuct . 
. Q. Then you didn't se,e. anything, and the 
next thing you s.aw was the· flash of the impact as 
it occurred~ · 
A. That's right. 
Q. During fhat inte:rval, you didn't. see him, 
during that short interval,· between the time~ you 
last 'Saw him and the impact·~ 
A. Well, I was watching Jack coming." 
Leon Wimber testified that Mr. .Cox was walking 
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from the east to the west and was looking to the west 
(R. 246- Tr. 231). He-testified Mr. Co_x was two or three 
feet into the lane in which defe·ndant was driving when he 
first noticed him and had continued to·walk to ap~p~roxi­
nlately the middle of the lane when the accident occurred 
(R. 262, 264- Tr. 247, 249). 
Cyril Thon1pson testified that decedent was moving 
to the west at the-time defendant first saw him (Tr. 286-
Tr. 271). 
The testimonY of all these. witnesses is substantiated 
- • ol • • 
by the physical evidence. 
The evidence is that defendant had consumed a con-
siderable amount of intoxicating liquor.· The evidence 
further.shows that Mrs. Cox had p.reviously divorced her 
husband on the ground of habitual drunkenneS's ~and that 
this was his first spree since D.ecember 29, 1950. It is 
not contended that decedent wws drunk or that intoxica-
tion alone was a cause of the accident. But the defendant 
does urge that this evidence should be· considered· in de-
termining the question of deceased's ne~gligence, and cer-
tainly this evidence tends to explain decedent';s overall 
lael{ of care ·and inattentiveness. 
Appellant is correct in the assertion that the court 
should direct a verdict only in clear ca.s.es,_ but in vi~w of· 
all the evidence, the <)nly conclusion upon which rea'son-
able minds could agree in this case is. that decedent, with 
a clear and unobstructed view of oncoming traffic for at 
least 500 yards (R. 66 - Tr. 50), f'ailed to yield the right 
of way to defendant's automobile, failed to observe the 
automobile or to hee<l the same, and walked directly into 
its path, thereby caus~ing his own d~ath . 
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POINT NO.3 
The causal connection between the ne·gligence of the 
deeede!nt and the accident is s-o p~atent as to preclude the 
submission of that issue to a jury. 
Appellant contends that even though decedent was 
negligent, the question of whether such negligence contri-
buted to his injuries was a question for the jury .. 
In Se:c. 6127 _of Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automo-
bile Law OJnd Prac-tice, it is stated: 
"Although one may be under the duty to look 
before cros:sing a city street, if he is injured by an 
automobile while crossing -and would escape the 
consequences of his negligence, he must show that, 
even if he had looked, the accident would still have 
happened.'' 
If Mr. Cox had paid heed to what was to be seen he 
would not have placed himself in a position of peril. He 
would not have. left his place of safety on the east. side of 
the highway and walked to the west directly in front of 
the oncoming vehicle. The fact is, as testified to by the 
witnesses, .the decedent walked into the point of impact · 
ap~parently oblivious to the imminent peril to which he 
subjected himself, and certainly under that state of f'acts 
it cannot be said tha.t the ·accident would have happened 
even if decedent had exercised the requisite degree of 
care. 
In Burgess v. Salt Lake City Railroad Compa.ny, 17 
Utah 406, 53 Pac. 1013, plaintiff in crossing Second South 
between Main and West Temple Streets looked for west-
bound ·Street cars, but failed to look for an eH:stbound car 
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and "~as injured '"'hen he stepped in front of the l'a.tter. 
There 'Yas some evidence that at the. place of the injury, 
there '"'ere flagstones laid flush 'vith the p·aving blocks 
indicating a crossing and also evidence that pedestrians 
crossed the street at any place between Main and West 
Temple. The court reversed a judgment in favor of plain-
tiff and reinanded the case for a new trial. In holding 
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law under the evidence, the court said, starting on page 
±10 of the lJtah Report: , 
·'On the other hand, the evidence shows that 
the plaintiff incautiously and heedlessly ste1pp·ed 
upon the track, where he received the injury. In 
the hurry of the moment, he attempted to cross. the 
street and track without exercising that care which 
a man of ordinary prudence ought to exercise · 
under like circumstances. Had he but used his 
senses it is clear that he could have avoided the 
accident. This it was his duty to do; and, having 
failed so to do, he cannot he heard to compl'ain of 
any injury that resulted from the failure which 
was the proximate cause thereof. 
"The plaintiff, in crossing the street, was 
bound to exercise the S'arne degree of care as that 
which it was incumbent upon the railway company 
to exercise. 
"The car has the right of way in case of meet-
ing a person or vehicle on the track, but each 
p~arty, in order to avoid accident, is bound to exer-
cise ordinary care, and such reason·able p~rudence 
and precaution as the surrounding circumstances 
may require." 
In Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah 369, 
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86 Pac. (2d) 37, a directed verdict in. favor of defendant 
was affirmed on the grounds that plaintiff was held guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in standing 
in a pedestrian lane, but so close to a passing bus that 
the overhang of the bus when turning struck her. The 
court on page 380 of the Utah Report quoted Kent · v. 
Ogden L. & Tr. Co., 50 tJtah 328, 167 Pac. 666: 
"When, as in this: case, there can be·no doubt 
whatever regarding the p,roximate cause of the 
accident, nor any doubt that it was wholly within 
the power of the deceased at any moment before 
the collision to have averted it by 1nerely n1oving 
a foot or two out of the zone of danger, this court 
cannot shirk its duty in determining the res:ult. 
* * * The deceased's inexcusable conduct consti-
tuted the pT'oximate cause: of the injury." 
In Trumbley v. Moore, (Neb.) 39 N:W. (2d) 613, 
plaintiff ·was crossing a street between intersections when 
struck by the defendant's vehicle. The evidence showed 
. tlu1t the wheels of the vehicle were straddling the center 
line of the road. A verdict for the plain tiff in the lower 
court was reverse~d on .aprpeal. r:rhe cour~ said: 
"It is true that the left whee~ls of the Hame-r 
car went over the center line, but there is no'thing 
to indicate that this was the proximate caus-e of 
plaintiff's injury~ The pro~imate cause of the 
injury wa;s the atte1npt of plaintiff to cross· the 
street between intersections without looking, or if 
he did look, in not seeing that which was in plain 
sight. * * * The evidence reveals nothing vvhich 
would excuse plaintiff's. failure to see the Ha1ner 
car and respect the right of ·way that it had. A 
right of way means nothing unle1ss persons obliged 
to respect it are required to see: an app·roaching 
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favored ear that is in plain sight. Plaintiff was 
negligent in attemp~ting to cross the street between 
intersections as he did. Negligence on the part of 
the defendant Hamer is not shown by this record. 
Under such circumstances plaintiff's own negli-
gence is the proximate cause of the accident and 
there is nothing for a jury to determine. The trial 
court should have directed a verdict for the de-
fendants." 
In 1llilligan v. Weare, (Maine), 28 Atl. (2d) 463, 
plaintiff sought to reco;ver for personal injuries sustained 
when defendant's car driven by his employee knocked 
him down as he was crossing a highway. The point of 
the three lane highway at which the accident occurred 
was an intersection which was marked with stop lights. 
Since traffic waiting .for the lights was blocking the 
crosswalk, plaintiff walked between cars and into the 
center lane, which "' ... as reserved for left turning, and· into 
the path of defendant's. rapidly approaching automobile. 
The court held : 
"By his own admission the plaintiff. without 
.warning walked through a line. of cars which, until 
.he emerged, obscured his moveJll_ents and step~ped 
out into the center lane of a main highway in 
front of a· rapidly moving automobile which must 
have been in plain view but wa.s not seen by him. 
* * * We are convinced that he either did not look 
at all to his left or if he did he was so inattentive 
that he failed to observe the dange-r which threat-
ened hiin and take available precaution~ for his 
own safety. He gave the drive~r of the app~:voaeh- . 
ing car no time or opportunity to -avoid the col-
lision. It was his orwn ne~gligence which "\Vas the 
proximate cause of his injuries." 
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In view of the aforementioned authorities, it is plain 
that when a person attempts t'O cross a highway and the 
evi!dence taken most favorably in his behalf shows that 
he heedlessly walked into the p·ath of an oncoming· ve-
. hicle, he has failed to exercise re'asonable care, and that 
failure is at least a contributing factor in hi:s injuries. 
That p-rinciple can have no greater ap~plication than to 
the case at bar. 
POINT NO. 4 
The evidence clearly shows that the doctrine of last 
clear chance CJould not be invoked and could not, there·-
fore, be s.uhmitte:d to the jury~ 
The doctrine of last clear chance has no application 
to a case where, 'a;s he~re, the defendant's negligence con-
tinues up 'to the event out of which the damage or injury 
arises. We quote the example given l?y Justice WoJfe in 
·Graham v. Jolvnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 P (2) 630, on page 
359 of the Utah Report: 
"A defendant is exceeding the lawful restrict-
ed sp·e.ed limit; another driver, the· plaintiff, fails 
to keep a p·roper lookout and crosses the path of 
the oncoming car and gets stalled on its path. 
Both up to that point might he guilty of negligence 
and neither he able to recove·r against the other. 
But if the oncoming driver, realizing the situation 
of the plaintiff, had a clear opportunity ·to avoid 
the accident and faile~d to utilize it, that counts 
just as if the plaintiff had not been negligent and 
the defendant had been." 
In the Mangus v. Olsen ca:se, sup~ra, where the evi-
dence would sustain a finding that the deceased had pro-
ceeded 19 feet from the curb of a street into the street at a 
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speed less than three miles per hour, and the defendant 
approached the point of impact at a speed of t'vent.y miles 
per hour, and the defendant eould have stopped his car 
had he seen deceased crossing, Judge Wade in a concur-
ring opinion on page 516 of the Utah Report said: 
Hln the present case, both defendant and de-
cedent were guilty of the san1e kind of negligence·. 
Each negligently failed to observe the· approach 
of the other. The negligence, of each continued to 
the time of the accident and either of them could 
have avoided the accident within a very short 
time prior to the impact had he observed the ap·-
proach of the other. There does not appear to be 
any good reaS'on why the last clear chance doctrine 
should allow a recovery under these circum-
stances." 
In this case the defendant could have avoided the 
accident up until almost the very instant of the impact 
had he been observing the proper care for his own safety. 
If, as argued by the plaintiff, he was on the' p·oint of en-
tering the intersection as defendant approached, he need-
ed only to have stepp·ed back. If he was on the point of 
leaving, he needed only to have hurried. Therefore, his 
negligence did continue up to and at least contribute to 
the impact. 
Moreover, the doctrine of last cl~ear chance also re-
quires that the defendant be aware of defendant's posi-
tion and able to do something about it. As was said in 
Compton v .Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Compa.n;y, supra, 
"\vhere deceased was killed while crossing a railroad 
track: 
"The rule approved by this court where plain-
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tiff is negligently inattentive: and has subjected 
himself to risk o{ harm as provided in ·section. 
480 is that he can recover from a defendant who 
knew .of his situation and· realized or had. reason 
to realize that plaintiff is inattentive, and unlikely 
to disco:ver his. peril in time~ to a void harm, and 
thereafter is negligent in failing to use ordinary 
care with the! means at his disposal to avoid harm-
ing him. For the rule: to be otherwise, we would 
again only have the ne·gligence of the plaintiff and 
defendant co~curring together to proximately 
cause the injury. * * * 
"In the principal case in order for plaintiffs 
to make out a. case of last clear chance, it would 
have been necessary that the defendant know 
that decedent was in ~ position of per1l, and in · 
addition have realized or had reason to realize 
that decedent was inattentive ~and un~ely to 
discover her peril in time to avoid the threatened 
harm, and de/enda.nt must thereafter have fa.iled 
to exe:rcise reasonable care in· connection with #s 
then existing ability to avoid harming decedent." 
(Italics ours.) 
Not ·only must the: evidence· show that the defendant 
had an opportunity to avoid the. accident after he becomes 
or has reason to he aware of plaintiff's negligence, but 
. the opportunity must be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
The case of Gra.ha.m. v. Johnson, 166 Pac. (2d) 2~0, 
109 Utah_ 346, involved the. opportunity .. of a defendant to 
avoid injury to a thirteen year old boy playing hall in 
the street The court s:a.id: 
"* * * But in the last clear chance doct.rine the 
word 'clear' ha:s significance. In a case such as 
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this when both parties are more or less rapidly 
changing their positions the evidence must be 
clear ~and convincing that the party when it is 
claimed could have avoided the accident had a 
'clear' chance to do so. 
hConstruing any reasonable combination of 
facts on this theory of the. case most favorable to 
Gary, if Darlene 'vas coming ·at 10 miles an hour 
down the extreme west side of the street and Don-
ald shouted at Gary setting him off toward thH car 
when he, as must in such case be inferred, was 
not then in danger, the jury must be instructed 
· that it shoul'd be cle·arly convinced in such case 
that she was far enough north of him as to give 
her a clear chance to avoid the accident. That 
is to say, she must have had. a clear and amp~le 
opportunity to seng.e the danger into which he 
was coming and clearly have had time after that 
to apply her brakes and stop the car after she 
sensed or should reasonably have sensed.that he 
was putting himself into danger. Otherwise there 
is no room for the app.Jieation of the last clear 
chance doctrine. One should not be held liable for 
failing to avord the effect of the .other's ne!gligence 
in a situation where it is speculative aS" to whether 
he was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. 
In a situation where both parties are on the move· 
the significance of the word 'clear' is most import-
ant. Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding 
the effect of one's negligence on a ·party not negli-
gent. That party's negligence only arises when it 
is definitely established that there was ample time 
and opportunity to avoid the accident which was 
not taken advantage of." 
The best evidence as to whether defendant had a 
clear chance to avoid injury to .the plaintiff after plaintiff 
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had p·la.ced _himself in .a p·erilous position and· defendant 
had become aware of or had to be aware of his situation 
and what defendant did to avoid the accident is the testi-
mony of defendant himself. He testified to the s:cene 
which confronted him as fol1ows (R. 286 - Tr. 271) : 
"Q. Well, what was the first thing you did 
s.ee that caused you any - caused you concern, if 
anything~ 
A. Well, I was just driving down the road, 
wer~n't saying anything, just driving, and I seen 
this-- well, I seen Mr. Cox now. I seen him when 
he s,tep·ped into the lights. And -that is the first 
time I seen him. 
Q. What lights do you have reference to~ 
A. The headlights on the car. He stepped 
in to the lane, where the lights go the strongest, 
down the center of the lane. 
Q. ·w·hich direction was he going~ 
A. .He was he·ading across the stree!t west. . 
Q. Did you see him at any time face! the car~ 
A. No, I couldn't see him. All I could see 
after I did ·see him was. a silhouette. The~e was no 
form there ·at all, just a dark silhouette. 
Q. When you first saw this silhouette in 
front of you, I will ask you how far ahead of you 
it was, ap·peared to be,_ as far as your vision was 
concerned~ 
A. W eil, I could s,ee the full length of him, 
and possibly - p.robably .two or thrHe· fe~e-t of high-
way. I couldn't specify as to how much highway, 
but I could see the full height of the man. 
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Q. Was he on the move, or was he standing 
still, or do you know'? 
.. .-\.. ,V .. ell, his leg-s were apart, I could see -
and I never seen him until he came into view into 
the lights from the side." 
On page '287 of the record (Tr. 272) defendant testi-
fied: 
"Q. And "That did you do if anything when 
you saw him~ 
.A.. \V. ell, I could see him stepp,ing to the 
west, so I immediately swerved the car to the east, 
which would have been my left. 
Q. Were y.our hands on the wheel during 
this time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had they been on the wheel prior to the 
time you swerved~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you do anything else, other than · 
swerve· your car~ 
A. Well, at the same. time I swerved, I prob-
ably depressed the clutch at the same time. It all 
happened at the same time. I swerved, depressed 
the clutch, and applied the brakes a small amount. 
I don't think I ap-plied them at all completely, be-
cause of the force of stopping and turning, it 
didn't seem reasonable. 
Q. You did ap·ply your brakes, you put your 
foot on the brakes ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. As soon as you could~ 
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Yes." 
In discussing this. aspect of the case~ appellant makes 
a numbHr of.assumptions not warranted by the evidence. 
For e:xample, on page 45 of his brief, appellant asks the 
court to assume1 defendant became aware of pJaintiff's 
situation before plaintiff entered the defendant's lane of 
travet The record contains no such testimony either ex-
pressly or by implication. 
Clearly, this evidence portrays a situation where · 
no further act of the defendant ciOuld have avoided the 
accident. The p·laintiff was immediately in front of de-
fendant when he first saw him. It was already too late to 
avoid the collision, even though the. defendant attempted 
to do so by· swerving to the left and braking his automo-
bile. 
Even assuming. defendant became aware or had 
reason, to he aware of plaintiff when he entered the de-
fendant's lane, defendant had no clear opportunity to 
avoid the collision. Police Officer Mower testified that 
at a speed .qf 40 miles per hour, it would require 126 
feet to stop· an automobile (R. 140). Assu:rnllig that de-
cedent· was walking at an ave·rage sp·eed of 4.1 feet per 
second (R. ------) and tha:t he had reached the middle of 
the lane when the impact occurred, it would take roughly 
one ·and one-half seoonds for him to re·ach the middle of 
the 12 foot lane (Ex. A) .. OffiC'er Mowe-r s~ated t1hat an 
automobile moving 40 miles· p·er hour would traveil 58 
feet per second (R. 141). At the beginning ·of the· one and 
one-half seconds which elapsed, assUming· that decedent 
had reached the middle of the lane when the accident oc-
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cnrred, the automobile would be 89 feet from the point of 
impact, too close to stop even had thH brakes been appJied 
at that \ery instant. 
The case at bar and the Mingus case are-close,ly simi-
lar as regards the doctrine of last clear chance·. The 
difference would seem to be only that the case at bar 
presents a much clearer factual situation for denying the 
application of the doctrine. It is readily seen that in 
this case the decedent was only a few ste·ps (6 fe,et at 
the· most) into the defendant's lane of travel when the 
accide~t occurred, whereas in the Mingus case the de-
cedent was 19 feet from the curb and the defendant's ve~­
hlcle moving only 20 mil·es per hour, whereas in this case 
the defendant's automobile was traveling between 35 and· 
40 miles per hour. And further, in the Mingus case, the 
decedent was proceeding between. the marked lines of a 
crosswalk at an intersection. In the case at bar the de-
cedent was walking across a thvough highway in viola-
tion of statute an.d at a point where the p-resence of a 
pedestrian could not be reasonably anticip·ated or fore-
seen by an automobile driver. And too, in the l\iingus 
case the intersection was lit by a street light. In the case 
at bar the evidence is that the area in the vicinity of the 
accident was darker than surrounding territory. 
The negligence of the decedent was continuing in this 
ease as in the Mingus case and it was wholly within the 
power of decedent at any p-oint to extricate himself from 
Iris perilous position had he exercised the requi'site de-
gree of care. As in the Mingus case, the doctrine of_last 
clear chance has no application to the facts of this case, 
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C·ONCLUSION 
In summarizing the evidence and the law of this case 
we can do no better than the Judge who heard the evi-
dence.. The following is taken from his remarks upon 
directing a verdiet, beginning on page 345 (Tr. 330) of 
the reeord: 
"In the light of the recent deeisions ·of our 
Court, I feel that these· things appear quite cer-
tainly: The deceased had gone seven or eight 
feet beyond the safety center lines. There· were 
approximately three feet between the two double 
lines. The traffic 1~anes are 12 feet wide. Th~ 
Court has indicated before that there could he no 
question of negligence on the part of the deceased 
. in leaving the curb, cros'Sing the stree't and stop-
ping and turning back •across the safety zone. 
The evidence e·stablishes beyond any per adven-
ture of a doubt whatsoever that the defendant was 
traveling in the center lane of southbound traffic, 
or in lane two. Thus, in order for the deceased to 
arrive in any position of peril, he, had to travel 
approximately 22 feet. 
"There isn't- any indication that he was ·eitheT 
hurrying, or that he was walking slugishly, and 
taking the rate of four and one tenth foot per 
second, it would require him approximately five 
and six te·nths seeonds to return from the place 
where he stopped and reverse·d his direction, to · 
reach the line of lane number two. 
"The plaintiff herself, the widow, and 1\Irs. 
Ferre, had called to the· decedent, and had seen 
him stop and turn to come back. They didn't watch 
him any further. Mrs. F·erre turned to open the 
door-no, Mrs. Cox turned to open the door of thf~ 
car to get in, when she heard the· emergency occur-
ring. The witness, Mr. F'erre, saw the deceased 
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stop and turn and 'valk back, and excepting for his 
glancing a'Yay for maybe a second or two, he said, 
he 'Ya:tched hi1n all the 'Yay, and state,d that he 
sa"~ the point of impart. He didn't even imply any 
erratic, sudden action on the part of the decedent 
That fact, considered in reference to the time 
required, "~ould n1ake it inconsistent to believe 
that there 'vas any appreciable stopping of the 
decedent in number one lane of traffic. 
"'Now in the :Jlingus case our Supreme C~ourt 
not only 'Yeighed the testimony of plaintiff, but 
also 'Yeighed the testimony of the defense, and had 
before it exactly the same problem·that faces this 
Court at this moment. 
'"From those things that I have now recited, 
the Court feels, even without any defense evi-
dence, that to submit the que~stion of whether or 
not the decedent continued oblivious to the ap-· 
proach of the defendant's automobile., would sub-
mit it only on a guess and a conjecture, and 
couldn't be supported by the evidence. 
"Then if we weigh into the scales the testi-
mony of the defendant and his witnesses, we find 
that the· defendant testified to seeing ·a shadow 
moving into the lane in which he was proceeding. 
The other two boys with him-you may call them 
biased witnesses in a certain respect, but you 
couldn't call them interested in the outcome of the 
case - they were friends. But allowing for tha:t, 
they cor~oborate the defendant's testimony, that 
the decedent was stepping into the lane of traffic 
before there was any action taken by the car. 
"Now the physical evidence further strength-
ens in this : That the impact-and considering 
only the physical evidence-could not have oc-
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curred, regardless of which position you may be-
lieve the body came to rest in, immediately at 
the place where, the chrome pieces were found. 
"The reeord establishes without any possible 
question of a doubt that prior to the car making 
any turns or the driver observing any emergency, 
it was going in the neighborhood of 35 ·miles an 
hour. 'l'he only evidence of rubber marks on the 
dry· cement indicE1tes that there was very little, if 
any at all, braking, in the skid marks. Bothe car 
was moving at substantially 30 to 35 miles an hour 
during the time of the action occurring from the 
first con~ct with the decedent's body. 
"It is absolutely undisp,uted that the body, 
in addition to being. struck, was thrown hack over 
· the radiator, striking with such force to dent the 
. hood and then sliding marks as it went off to the 
side. That sort of action does. not occur with e(X-
plosive ·timing. And in the meantime, the car 
was . p~rogressing at about, roughly, around 30 
miles an hour, in its. direction toward the double 
center line and acroS's to where it came to rest. 
"In the most generous possible interp,reta-
tion for the plaintiff, and considering the course 
of those marks with respect to the lateral lines 
of the traffic lane, considering that th~· defendant 
had been traveling approximately in the center 
of ·that lane, from the faet that he was able to see 
the side line on the driver's side a.s he· came along, 
and in head, and while he wa.s looking out through 
the window of his door, and the· fact that the· car 
is in excess of five feet in width, three feet is. a 
reasonable estin1ate of the distance between his 
car and the side, line in order that he might so see. 
Five feet would be eight feet. The deceased struck 
not on the extreme -right corner of the car, bu-c 
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struck the grill of the radiator on the right side, 
and near the right front headlight, from which 
the chrome 'Yas broken. The fact that the de-
c.eased went up on top of the car, the hood, indi-
cates that the prhna.ry force was practically in 
the direct line of the travel of the car, rathe:r than 
in a slanting line. The natural law of the break-
age of the chrome under such circumstances would 
cause the chrome to proceed furthHr along the line 
of the force that 'vas propelling it at the time. 
"That coupled with the fact that it required 
the time to pass over on top of the hood and fall 
off, whether it reached the position on the high-
way described by the officer or the p·osition on the 
highway described by the plaintiff's witnesses, 
required time sufficient that at that rate· of sp·eed, 
definitely s·hows the occurrence of the imp·a:ct with-
in, and well within, the number two lane of traffic, 
far enough so that the deceased, if he had jumped 
in head, would have had to jump anywhere frorr1 
seven to eight feet. If he walked straight into i't, 
of course, he was negligent If he jump;ed into it, 
he'd have to stop. The calculation of the times, 
the positions, in the Court's judgment, leaves the 
inescapable conclusion that as a matter of law 
the de~eased was wholly oblivious to anything that 
was going on around him, so far as traffic was 
concerned; that he walked directly from the place 
\Vhere he stopped and reversed his course, into 
the number two lane ; that he did not see, or if he 
did see, that he did not heed the approach of the 
defendant's car, and that therefore he was negli-
gent as a matter of law. 
"And the last clear chance doctrine, not being 
available in this case, his ne·gligence proxirnately 
contribute·d to produce his death as a n1atter of 
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law, and therefore, as a mat1ter of law, the plain~ 
tiff cannot recover." 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART,' CANNON & HANS:ON 
By: EDWIN B. CANNON 
REX J. HANSON 
DoN J. HANSON 
ERNEST F:. BALDWIN 
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